Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) recently gained a huge victory in reclaiming Wad Madani, the capital of Gezira state in central Sudan. Wad Madani is very critical for its agricultural and trading hub status, and its proximity to the capital, Khartoum. Just a year ago, people had to flee Madani and survive under Rapid Support Forces (RSF)’s subjugation and now, there is joyous celebration in the army’s recapture.
Despite this development, Sudan is still currently experiencing the most severe humanitarian crisis of unprecedented magnitude after being embroiled in a civil conflict for almost two years. It is the largest displacement crisis, with over 8 million internally displaced and 3 million escaping to neighbouring Central African Republic (CAR) countries that have been bearing a heavy weight for the international community. As of August 2024, according to UNHCR, famine has already been confirmed in parts of North Darfur. With over 25 million people experiencing a lack of food security as a result of the fighting halting farming and agriculture, this is poised to become the biggest hunger crisis in history.
Children are the most vulnerable to this, as 729,000 children under five suffer from severe acute malnutrition, while over 2.9 million children are critically malnourished. Additionally there have been outbreaks of cholera and malaria in refugee camps due to the unsanitary conditions and lack of clean water.
Moreover, this conflict has led to bombings, ethnically motivated killings and war crimes against the Masalit in West Darfur by the RSF as they have also been historically and violently oppressed by the militia.
There have also been reports of sex slavery and rape that emerged days after the conflict began. Human Rights Watch documented the widespread sexual violence and crime in areas like Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Most of these violent acts are commited by the RSF, and the report details out how the RSF would seize and assault them in the streets and some even went as far as subjecting these girls and women to marriage. In addition to debilitating physical disabilities, victims suffer grave mental health repercussions. These women lack access to essential and thorough emergency medical care, and healthcare providers find it particularly difficult to offer that given the intentional attacks on their facilities and medical staff by the RSF and SAF.
In a time when international aid can be hard to reach, Sudanese civilians are stepping up and setting up temporary Emergency Response Rooms (ERR) and communal kitchens to safeguard and protect their fellow citizens. Seen as a “local emergency government”, ERRs have become central and a practical structure for providing aid, and it is used for evacuation, providing food, alternative education for children as well as helping sexual assault victims.
However, in a dangerous and unstable situation, the RSF and SAF target these organisations along with activists and volunteers. The transportation of help and supplies, the capacity to host displaced individuals, and their freedom of movement are all being further restricted, and they are also being harassed and intimidated. For example, following Facebook posts demanding the end of the conflict, SAF intelligence detained four protests in Al Faw town on May 6. At least six volunteers running communal kitchens in Khartoum’s Sharq Elneil were detained and interrogated by RSF for days in March 2024.
With a crisis this severe, you would think the international community would be working consistently to “bring peace to Sudan”. After all, the Sudanese are left to face the brunt of this deadly and violent conflict, and humanitarian organisations are chronically underfunded to assist them in meeting their growing humanitarian needs in the midst of a war with no end in sight.
However, what you will find is foreign countries interfering and exploiting the conflict to expand their influence and the failure of diplomatic global organisations like the UN as well as powerful Western countries giving weak-willed sanctions and condemnations without actually addressing the problem.
Before we get into the foreign interference, let’s briefly talk about how this war started. On 15 April 2023, fighting broke out in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, between the army, the SAF, and the paramilitary RSF. The army defends and maintains peace, while paramilitary groups are unofficial and formed to enforce and protect against internal threats like terrorism, guerrilla operations, and counterinsurgency.
Heavy gunfire could be heard and armoured vehicles were seen roving the streets. The lengthy power struggle between the SAF and RSF, particularly between their opposing leaders, Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo (RSF) and General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (SAF), was the catalyst of instability. Both groups are vying for the control of the state and resources, and have been taking territories.
The RSF is a paramilitary group that was created by former President Omar Al-Bashir in 2013 for his own protection, and he was then betrayed by both RSF and SAF in 2019 after months of pro-democracy protests. Both groups were meant to help Sudan in the democratic transition, but they still retained power even with a civilian leader, Abdollah Hamdok and then overthrew him in 2021. After 2021, Burhan was de facto head of state with both him and Hemediti were left with the power to direct the govt’s democratic transition. In late 2022, a deal laid the groundwork for the democratic transition but many civilians contested due to retaining state powers, excluding their demands and not holding the state leaders accountable. Meanwhile, there were obstacles in the implementation of the plan as Hemediti was now Burhan’s equal and the integration of RSF into SAF was a source of disagreement. No deadline was specified on the integration due to this and they missed the cut-off point to establish conditions for the agreement’s implementation. That power struggle stalled the country’s transition efforts, leading us to April 15 2023
Although both the SAF and RSF are at fault for creating this severe crisis, the RSF is infamous in its role for the war, if they haven’t already been notorious before. They have already had a violent past as they were created from Janjaweed militia, an Arab-majority armed group funded by Bashir to subdue southern Sudanese rebels, and prominently fought in the Darfur war. Currently, they have been accused of ethnic cleansing in West Darfur, targeting the Masalit,and killing thousands of people. The RSF has also been connected to UAE, Libya and Russia, who have been aiding their efforts in the war for their gain.
Libya’s Supreme Commander, General Khalifa Haftar has been secretly backing the RSF and focusing on diverting resource flows into Sudan in order to acquire political capital and economic gains from his large number of supporters. Furthermore, Sudan’s refugee dilemma was used to recruit international aid, with his government in eastern Libya positioned as an essential partner in migration and humanitarian assistance, appearing as a stabiliser while escalating the war.
Russia is using the Wagner group, a state-funded private military organisation, to deliver weapons and aid to the RSF. They have been involved in Sudan since 2017, obtaining rich gold mining concessions in exchange for political and military aid to the administration of Omar al-Bashir. Additionally, they are providing military assistance in return for a naval facility at Port Sudan to further strengthen its ties with the SAF.
Most prominently, the UAE is considered the most invested in this war. Sudan has become a strategic location to exert their control and influence in the Middle East and east Africa, especially against Saudi Arabia reportedly. For starters, prior to its cancellation, the UAE had invested more than $6 billion in the country. This comprises foreign funds in Sudan’s central bank, agricultural projects, and a Red Sea port. Abu Dhabi has been undermining Sudan’s democratic transition since 2019 by giving the army and paramilitary forces more authority to combat the government’s civilian branch.
Since the civil conflict began, the UAE has concentrated on the Rapid Support Forces. The UAE set up logistical operations to provide the Rapid Support Forces with weaponry via its networks in the Central African Republic, according to UN experts. They passed off supplies and weapons as humanitarian assistance. For instance, the UAE supplies the RSF with weapons through Chad, particularly at the airport in Amdjarass, a small town in eastern Chad, where it is rumoured that UAE cargo planes land and unload weapons before heading across the border to RSF bases in Darfur. Another example occurred in November, when Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) militants intercepted a convoy in Darfur’s arid desert. The video shows fighters breaking open crates in the hot sun, revealing Kornet anti-tank missiles, ammunition, and fighting equipment. The rebels blame the UAE for allegedly arming the opposing Rapid Support Forces (RSF). They also have been deploying foreign mercenaries
Hemedti looks after Emirati interests in Sudan, particularly those related to gold and agricultural goods. He is the owner of one of the most profitable gold mines in the nation, Jebel Amer in North Darfur, and has amassed enormous personal wealth from the gold trade in particular. The primary gainer from this trade is the UAE. It has turned into a centre for laundering trafficking gold into the international market and gets almost all of the gold that is smuggled from Sudan. According to the most recent data available, the UAE officially imported US$2.3 billion worth of precious metals from Sudan in 2022.
With its military backing and mining and agricultural investments, the UAE is attempting to dominate Sudan’s energy, minerals, and transportation routes.
On the other side, Egypt has been backing the SAF with military aid, particularly air support, due to their long ties with the army and they want to maintain regional influence. However they have also been supporting diplomatic initiatives in Sudan to encourage ceasefires and a transition headed by the military.
Egypt is also a key ally of Saudi Arabia, who has aligned with SAF. As mentioned earlier, UAE and Saudi Arabia have been using Sudan to advance their own interests and influence. Like UAE’s contribution to Sudan’s economy, Riyadh declared in October 2022 that it will invest up to $24 billion in mining, agriculture, and infrastructure in Sudan during their Future Investment Initiative (FII) conference . During the war, however, Saudi Arabia stabilised the Red Sea corridor, prioritising Red Sea tourism and presenting themselves as the “peacemaker”. Riyadh has supported cease-fire negotiations with the United States in Jeddah, given aid to Sudanese citizens both domestically and abroad, and assisted in the evacuation of numerous civilians from Khartoum. This is to secure strategic advantages and investment opportunities while countering the UAE’s militarised approach to influence.
This interference and exploitation of the conflict has already contributed to irrevocable damage to Sudan, because each country is only looking out for their own interests, at the expense of Sudanese who have to bear the violence of these forces
International community response has been slightly lackluster. Despite numerous humanitarian conferences, only a small amount of the $4.1 billion requested by the U.N. in February 2024 has been provided. The 2025 Humanitarian Needs Response Plan of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimates that US$4.2 billion will be required to supply life-saving assistance to over 21 million vulnerable people, restore essential services, and increase protection.
US recently accused RSF and its allies of genocide in Sudan. According to US Secretary of State Antony Blinken‘s statement on January 7 2025, the RSF has methodically killed men and boys based on their ethnicity and directly attacked citizens. Their sanctions against the RAF’s commander, Mohamad Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo, and many of its shell businesses in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) may damage the group’s legitimacy. However this was only done a year later. Moreover, the U.S. special envoy for Sudan, Tom Perriello, has not provided any concrete ways to carry out the 2023 Jeddah declaration which demanded civilian protection and included a specific pledge that the RSF and rival Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) vacate and refrain from occupying public and private spaces.
Additionally, according to the Guardian, U.K. government authorities have been blocking discussions over the UAE’s membership in the Security Council for months, even after the Labour Party took office in July. African diplomats have even been actively prevented from accusing the United Arab Emirates by the UK government.
By consistently delaying its response to the findings of its own Panel of Experts on Sudan till 2024, the UN Security Council (UNSC) has also failed to assist. These results corroborate “credible” allegations that the RSF received weapons and ammunition from the United Arab Emirates in defiance of the Darfur arms ban. During their meeting on September 11 2024, the UNSC extended their sanctions against Sudan, which includes asset freezes, travel bans and an arms embargo, until 12 September 2025.
In November 2024, the UNSC had gathered in Sudan to hold a high-level briefing on the war, international humanitarian efforts as well discussing a resolution to adopt aimed at helping the Sudanese citizens. Nevertheless, despite 14 Council members voting in favour of the resolution, which was co-authored by the UK and Sierra Leone, Russia vetoed it because they were worried about compromising Sudan’s sovereignty.At least efforts were made to deliver aid, with all pertinent UN agencies setting up supply hubs in North Kordofan’s El Obeid, South Kordofan’s Kadugli, and Blue Nile’s Ad-Damazin. Additionally, the Adre crossing was extended, which greatly aids cross-border humanitarian operations.
However, there have been no concrete steps taken to put a stop to the fighting, and actively condemn the countries contributing to the war.If we cannot trust our international institutions to be impartial in these times of crisis, what can even be done to help Sudan?
Palestine recently gained some reprieve as Hamas and the Israeli government had finally reached a ceasefire deal on January 15 2025. Prior to the ceasefire, international civilians exerted significant collective pressure on international institutions and multinational corporations that supported Israel through boycotts, rallies, and social media platforms like X and Tiktok. Not only that, but significant world leaders from China, Saudi Arabia, and France, among others, as well as bodies such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have condemned Israel’s administration. We need to have that same energy for Sudan
Because multiple nations having a stake in escalating the fight for their own gain are at the core of the power struggle, the Sudanese civil war is seen as an extremely complicated conflict. In the end, we must continue to exert pressure on our institutions and organisations and learn more about Sudan. A coordinated effort is required to adversely affect especially the nations that stand to gain from this conflict; sanctions and condemnation alone will not suffice.
